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Abstract
Increased competition for viewers’ time is threatening the viability of public-
service broadcasters (PSBs) around the world. Changing regulations regard-
ing advertising minutes might increase revenues, but little is known about
the structure of advertising demand. To address this problem, we collect a
unique dataset on monthly impacts (quantities) and prices of UK television
channels between 2002 and 2009 to estimate the (inverse) demand for adver-
tising on both public and commercial broadcasters. We find that increasing
PSB advertising minutes to the level permitted for non-PSBs would increase
PSB and industry revenue by 10.5% and 6.7%.
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1. Introduction
The number of minutes of broadcast television devoted to advertising is a con-
tentious issue in European public policy. Current EU directives limit the amount
of advertising on broadcast television to 12 minutes per hour, but 21 of 28 Eu-
ropean sector regulators impose tighter restrictions.1 In the UK, for example,
public-service broadcasters (PSBs) may not exceed a daily average of 7 minutes
per hour (8 minutes per hour during peak morning and evening hours), with a
hard maximum of 12 minutes per hour in any individual hour; non-PSBs may not
exceed a daily average of 9 minutes per hour.2 Advertising limits are even more
stringent elsewhere in Europe, where sector regulators in France and Spain have
banned advertising entirely from each country’s PSBs (The Economist (2008), The
Economist (2009b)), and in Germany where they have considered such a ban
(Filistrucchi et al. (2012)).3 In 2016, The European Commission (EC) considered
amending its 12 minute per hour limit in the face of increased competition from
internet television services like Netflix, but ultimately decided to leave to let each
country’s regulators make such decisions.
Two economic factors are paramount for assessing the effects of advertising minute
regulations. The first is the effect advertising support has on programming. Be-
cause PSBs must deliver audiences to survive, some argue that they have be-
come more like their commercial rivals, resulting in ever-more “Least-Common
Denominator” programming (Steiner (1954), Owen and Wildman (1992), Wilbur
(2008)).4 This was the primary factor articulated by President Nicolas Sarkozy be-
hind France’s abolition of advertising on their PSBs and for country regulator’s
opposition to the European Comission’s summarized above ((European Comis-
sion, 2016, Annex 2)).
The second important factor is revenue. The rise of internet- and multi-channel
television coupled with the widespread growth in Internet use in the last 20 years
has chipped away at PSB audiences, eroding their revenue base. Combined with
1The countries without additional regulation on advertising minute regulation for either pub-
lic sector or private broadcasters are Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Malta and
Slovenia ((European Comission, 2016, Chapter 6)).
2See (Ofcom, 2008, Annex 2, 3). Furthermore, advertisements for certain products (tobacco,
alcohol, ‘junk’ food and prescription medicines) are also proscribed.
3The ban on PSB advertising in France implemented in January 2009 removed all advertising
on PSB channels during prime time viewing hours, 20.00 - 06.00, with the intent of extending it
include all broadcast hours in January 2011. This extension was delayed in October 2010 after re-
ports that the peak viewing ban had reduced ad revenues by half - and that there was insufficient
other public funding forthcoming to overcome any additional decreases in revenue. Advertising
on PSBs in Spain was banned across in all viewing hours from September 2009. In Germany,
while programs can be sponsored, advertising on PSB channels after 20.00 has been banned since
1991. Proposals to ban the sponsorship of non-sports broadcast content and to ban advertising
before 20.00 were proposed in 2010 but not implemented.
4Wilbur (2008) finds ad-supported commercial broadcasters in the US select programming
more likely to appeal to demographics favored by advertisers.
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a reduction in governmental support after the Great Recession, revenues for PSBs
in Europe have remained relatively flat over the past decade ((European Comis-
sion, 2016, Section 3)). In the UK, for example, 2008 revenues to PSBs fell 7.2%,
with a further decline of 10-20% in 2009 (Ofcom (2009)). By 2015, PSB revenues
had improved slightly on their 2008 levels, but still lagged far behind the double-
digit growth levels of non-PSB and Internet advertising (Ofcom, 2016). Stagnant
PSB advertising revenue combined with the rising popularity of internet televi-
sion are threatening the viability of PSBs and requiring sector regulators and/or
governments to consider how to fill the gap.5 While France and Spain have at-
tempted to replace lost PSB revenues through taxes on commercial broadcasters
and telecommunications operators, in 2007 and again in 2011 the UK considered
amending existing advertising minute regulation in part to help fulfill the pur-
poses of public-service broadcasting.6
Understanding the revenue consequences from advertising minute changes is
conceptually straightforward: one needs only an estimate of the aggregate de-
mand for (PSB) advertising minutes. Unfortunately, there is little empirical ev-
idence on this basic question. The problem is largely down to data availability:
while industry advertising minutes are widely reported by audience measure-
ment firms like BARB in the UK or Gfk in Germany, advertising price data is
considered sensitive competitive information and is generally unavailable.7
In this paper, we measure the revenue consequences to UK television broadcast-
ers of changed in advertising minute regulation. We utilize a unique, proprietary,
monthly dataset from Omnicom Media Group (OMG) to estimate the (inverse)
demand for audiences by advertisers. Our data runs between January 2002 and
July 2009 and provides information on advertising “impacts” (quantities) and
prices for the three main PSB channels - ITV1, Channel 4 (C4), and Channel 5
(Five) - a channel group consisting of the non-PSB channels sold through the
Sky sales house (Sky), and a composite of digital “portfolio channels” launched
and owned by the PSBs but not subject to the same public-service requirements
(ITV2, Film 4, Fiver/5*, etc.).8 We denote this last group of channels “PSB Digi-
tals.” We then use our inverse demand estimates to investigate the the revenue
consequences of counterfactual changes in the permitted number of advertising
minutes. 9
5In the UK, the telecommunications and media regulator, the Office of Communications
(Ofcom), has expressed concern that some advertising-supported PSBs may relinquish their
public-service licenses (and obligations) and compete instead as commercial broadcasters (The
Economist (2009a)).
6See the discussion at http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/
market-data-research/tv-research/arr/.
7TV advertising data is typically only readily available in the public domain at a quarterly
frequency, and even then only aggregated across channels (e.g. Hendry (1992)).
8An “impact” is the viewing of a 30-second advertisement by an individual viewer. We pro-
vide a description of the UK advertising market in Section 2 below.
9The genesis for the project was a set of reports we helped prepare for Ofcom
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We choose to estimate inverse demand equations rather than direct demand equa-
tions because UK broadcasters can only influence the quantity of advertising
minutes and quality of programming they offer (which together determine im-
pacts). We estimate five equations relating monthly advertising prices to the im-
pacts generated by each the channels or channel groups described above. We
include in the model the effects of other factors that shift the inverse demand
for advertising, including the supply of monthly Internet impacts and proxies
for demand by advertisers (the value of the FTSE 100). As decisions are made by
market participants several months previous to ads being aired based on their ex-
pectations of prices and impacts in the market, we allow for both dynamic effects
(captured by lagged price effects in the inverse demand equations) and measure-
ment error in both prices and impacts. We estimate by Instrumental Variables
to address concerns of bias from measurement error, using lagged impacts as
instruments.
We find that both short- and long-run estimated own-impact flexibilities are in-
flexible, ranging from -0.04 (for PSB Digitals) to -0.8 (for Five) in the short-run
and between -0.39 (for Five) to -1.21 (for Channel Four) in the long-run. Inflexi-
ble own-impact flexibilities are analogous to elastic own-price elasticities in that
both imply that an increase in impacts yields an increase in channel revenue, con-
trolling for other impacts (prices) in the market (Houck (1966); Huang (1994)).
We evaluate the magnitudes of these effects in a counterfactual analysis that
changes the limits on advertising minutes for PSBs and non-PSBs in the UK
television advertising market. Following Ofcom’s own proposals in this area
(c.f. (Ofcom, 2008, p9)), we measure the effects of two proposed policy changes.
The first, “harmonizing up,” eliminates the difference in regulatory treatment be-
tween PSBs and non-PSBs by allowing PSBs to advertise up to a daily average of 9
minutes per hour, the outcome of which Ofcom estimated would increase the im-
pacts provided by the three UK PSBs by between 8.0% and 12.3% ((Ofcom, 2008,
p74,76)). The second, “harmonizing down,” would instead harmonize the treat-
ment of PSBs and non-PSBs by restricting non-PSBs to advertise up to the PSB
daily average of only 7 minutes per hour, the outcome of which Ofcom estimated
would decrease the impacts provided by the non-PSBs, Sky and PSB Digitals, by
approximately 6.9%.
Our results show that a policy harmonizing up would increase total PSB revenue
by 10.5%, with increases at ITV1 of 10.6%, at C4 of 9.0%, and at Five of 13.8%.
The policy is estimated to have a negligible long-run effect on Sky and the PSB
Digitals, and that total industry revenue would increase by 6.7%. In contrast, we
to better understand the demand for television advertising in the UK. See http:
//stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/tv-research/arr/
and http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/other/
tv-research/econometric-analysis/ for further details. Note, however, that the
conclusions in this paper differ from those in the reports. We discuss the reasons for these
differences in Section E in the Appendix.
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find harmonizing down would modestly increase total PSB revenue (by 2.6%,
due mostly to an increase for ITV1 in response to decreased impacts at Sky),
leave revenue for Sky unchanged, decrease significantly PSB Digitals’ revenue
(by 14.2%), and leave industry revenue unchanged. While we do not measure
the consequences of increased advertising minutes on the television viewer ex-
perience or the effectiveness of advertising, we nonetheless conclude that per-
mitting more PSB advertising minutes could increase PSB revenue in the face of
increased competition from both multi-channel television providers and Internet
media consumption.
Previous Literature. While there is a voluminous academic literature analyzing
the impact of advertising on consumer behavior (Bagwell (2007)), there is sur-
prisingly little empirical work analyzing the demand and supply of advertising
by advertisers.10 Goettler (2012) and Wildman et al. (2004) estimate reduced-form
relationships of the responsiveness of advertising prices to audience size, but do
not estimate the demand for audiences.
Bel and Dome`nech (2009) and Wilbur (2008) are important exceptions. Bel and
Dome`nech (2009) relate advertising prices to advertising minutes and channel
audiences in the Spanish television market, but do not account for the possible
endogeneity of either variable or the presence of measurement error in prices
and quantities. Wilbur (2008) models both sides of the television market (i.e. the
demand for programming by households and the demand for audiences by ad-
vertisers) and estimates aggregate advertiser demand for those audiences. Care
is also taken to account for potential endogeneity of viewership, advertising min-
utes, and/or advertising prices in estimation.11 While the focus of Wilbur (2008)
is limited to aggregate demand for advertising on U.S. broadcast television net-
works, the basic framework can be extended to allow for multiple channels, dif-
ferentiated (PSB and non-PSB) broadcasters, and advertising limits of the kind
used in the UK market. The modeling in this project is broadly based on the
approach taken there.
The analyses closest in spirit to ours are those by Filistrucchi et al. (2012) and
Zhang (2016). Filistrucchi et al. (2012) uses weekly impact and price data from
TNS France for all major ad-supported French television channels between 2007
and 2009 to analyze the effects of a preliminary phase of the French ban on PSB
10Older empirical work includes Hendry (1992), Masih (1999), and PriceWaterhouseCoopers
(2004). Anderson and Jullien (2016) contains a summary of more recent theoretical work on ad-
vertising in two-sided markets while Berry and Waldfogel (2016) summarize the recent empirical
work where quantity of advertising is a choice variable and not regulated by governnment agen-
cies.
11We do not allow for possible feedback effects of increased advertising minutes on view-
ership by households, as an analysis prepared for Ofcom (Analysys Mason and BrandScience
(2010); Analysys Mason (2011)) found the elasticity of consumer viewing to changes in advertis-
ing minutes to be sufficiently small that we are comfortable ignoring such effects.
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advertising between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. Their preliminary results comple-
ment our findings: gross advertising revenues for PSBs decline after the introduc-
tion of the ban, but much of the loss between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. is recovered
by increased PSB ad revenues between 6:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. Zhang (2016)
also uses French data and studies the impact of removing ad minute regulations
using data from 2014. She finds that removing the regulatory caps leads to the
addition of one 30 second ad per 2 hours and has no significant effects on adver-
tising prices. Her estimates suggest that deregulating advertising minutes would
yield an additional 7.11 million Euros per channel per year in profits, equivalent
to 0.7 % of broadcast costs for TF1, largest French PSB in terms of audience share,
or 3.7% of broadcast costs for a M6 Group, a PSB of average size.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the market for television
advertising in the UK, paying particular attention to features of the market that
influence the specification of our econometric model. In section 3, we introduce
the OMG price data that permits the analysis. In section 4, we highlight the rea-
sons for our choice of an inverse demand specification, introduce the reasons for
and consequences of measurement error in our analysis, and present the econo-
metric model and estimation methods we use in the analysis. Section 5 presents
the results, section 6 presents our analysis of the likely revenue effects of changes
in limits on advertising minutes, and section 7 concludes.
2. The UK Television Advertising Market
In this section, we describe how audiences are bought and sold in the UK tele-
vision advertising market, including any constraints placed on the market by
regulations mandated by Ofcom. These institutional details motivate our speci-
fication choices for the econometric model introduced in section 4.
Market Overview. Television markets are two-sided markets. Broadcast televi-
sion stations and cable and satellite television systems provide a platform con-
necting households with program producers and advertisers. Households value
the entertainment they get from watching television programs and are willing to
pay for that entertainment. As they watch, they create audiences that, in turn,
have value to advertisers. In pay-television markets, households “pay” for pro-
gramming with both time (watching advertisements during and between pro-
grams) and money (monthly subscription fees).12 In broadcast television mar-
kets, there are typically no subscription fees and households only pay with their
12Examples of pay-television markets are the markets for cable and/or satellite subscription
services offered by Sky Television in many Western European countries, including the UK, and
television subscription services offered by the traditional telecommunication companies such as
Vodafone TV, Virgin Media, and BT Vision.
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willingness to watch ads.13,14
In the advertising market, advertisers demand audiences whilst broadcast and
pay television channels supply them. Advertisers are typically firms who value
audiences for the ability to inform and/or persuade them of the merits of their
products or services.15 Developing an advertising campaign strategy, designing
the creative advertisements, and planning the actual purchases of advertising
time, however, are specialized skills often not held by advertisers. As a result,
they typically contract most or all of these elements of the advertising process to
advertising agencies like GroupM, Omnicom Media Group, and Dentsu Aegis.16
Within a country, there are typically many individual broadcast and pay tele-
vision channels.17 Airtime on those channels are often sold on behalf of those
channels by broadcasting sales houses.18 Broadcast television channels can be
divided into two groups: Public Service Broadcasters (PSBs) and non-PSBs. PSBs
are required to provide programming that is in the public interest as a condition
of their license; non-PSBs have no such restrictions. The primary PSBs in the
UK are the BBC, ITV, Channel 4 (C4), and Channel 5 (Five). The BBC is prin-
cipally funded by an annual television license fee and sells no advertising. The
remaining PSBs have no license fees and are fully advertising-supported, as are
all non-PSB channels in the broadcast television market.19
13Broadcast television markets encapsulate all other television markets where content is (tra-
ditionally) distributed via radio waves and can be received by any household with an antenna.
The key distinction between broadcast television and pay television is that households pay sub-
scription fees to gain access to content under pay television whereas there are typically no fees to
access broadcast television.
14In this paper, we focus only on the advertising side of the market. See Crawford and Yu-
rukoglu (2012) and Crawford et al. (2016) for econometric analyses of both sides of the U.S. pay-
television market.
15See Bagwell (2007) for the canonical survey of the economic analysis of advertising. Renault
(2016) reviews the recent literature on the role of advertising in consumer decision making.
16There is often further specialization within agencies. For example, some advertising agen-
cies specialize in designing the actual advertisements (so-called creative agencies) while others
specialize in purchasing advertising time (so-called media buyers). For simplicity, we will refer
to all such firms as ad agencies.
17Examples of broadcast television channels in the UK include the BBC One, ITV, Channel 4,
and Five, all of which are PSBs, and channels such as Dave, E4, ITV2, and 5USA all of which
are non-PSBs. Pay television channels in the UK include Sky Sports, Discovery Channel, Nick-
elodeon, and MTV (among many others).
18For example, in the UK, ITV owns four broadcast television channels: ITV1 (often just called
ITV), and ITV2-ITV4. Time on all these channels (and related ITV properties) are all sold through
ITV Media, ITV’s sales house.
19The revenue model for pay television channels differs from that of broadcast television chan-
nels. As for broadcast channels, pay channels sell audiences and receive advertising revenues;
unlike broadcast channels, they also negotiate “affiliate fees” from pay-television operators like
Sky and Virgin Media who then charge households for access to these channels. In the US pay
television market, these fees are typically set at a flat rate per subscriber and differ by channel
and operator. See ? for more discussion of these contracts in the US pay television context.
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Impacts (Quantities) and Prices. In the UK television advertising market, audi-
ences are measured in “impacts.” An impact is one viewing of an advertisement
by an individual television viewer. Since TV ads can be of different lengths (typi-
cally 10, 20, 30, or 60 seconds), broadcasters weight the impacts delivered for any
individual ad to its thirty-second equivalent according to the value of that length
relative to a 30-second ad.20 Impacts may be differentiated by the demographic
characteristics of the viewer and are measured in the UK by the Broadcasters’ Au-
dience Research Board (BARB), an audience measurement organization jointly
owned by the major British producers of television programming. The price of
an impact is typically expressed as a “cost per thousand (impacts),” or CPT.
When an advertiser decides to book a campaign, they consult with their ad agency
to decide how many impacts are needed to get the desired effects. They agree
on facets such as timing, channel mix, regional mix, and budget. The media
buyer estimates the price to deliver the desired impacts by region, audience de-
mographic, and month (as well as the total price). For any single region, de-
mographic, month, and broadcast channel, there are two important factors that
determine this price. The first is the station average price (SAP) of a television
channel in the given month. The SAP is determined by the total revenue (across
all demographics and time periods) of the channel in that month divided by the
total impacts delivered in the desired demographic. The second is the discount
(or premium) on the SAP due on the purchased impact.
While the discount or premium from SAP can vary by advertiser or even by ad,
it is more typically given by the discount negotiated between the broadcast sales
house and the media buyer.21 This discount is typically set in annual contracts
between media buyers and sales houses and is largely determined by two impor-
tant factors. The first is the magnitude of the commitment by the media buyer to
spend either a fixed share of the media buyer’s total television advertising budget
(aggregating across advertisers) and/or a volume guarantee, or both. The second
is the “share of commercial impacts” (SOCI) delivered by a broadcast channel in
the market. As larger audiences imply less duplication of advertising spending,
advertisers are often willing to pay a premium for placing ads on those channels
that have a larger share of the market. Like contracts between buyers and sales
houses, SOCI is determined annually based on the performance of each channel
in the previous calendar year.
The number of impacts supplied on a particular program depends on two things:
the number of individuals that watch that program and, as discussed above, the
number of advertising minutes on that program. The number of individuals that
20These differ by broadcasters and are published as “commercial length rate factors.” There
were no changes to these factors over the period we study.
21Unlike in some media markets, advertisers in the UK purchase impacts from a broadcast
sales house, but do not (generally) select the individual programs on which those ads are shown.
The scheduling of ads across programs is itself done by the sales houses.
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watch a program is determined by the attractiveness of the programming relative
to other programs on at the same time and any non-television options.
An important and unusual institutional feature of the supply of programming in
the UK in the period that we study is that both PSBs and non-PSBs had incentives
to sell all their advertising minutes (and thus all their impacts) at all times. For
PSBs, selling all their available airtime was a requirement of their PSB license.22
Non-PSBs, on the other hand, had an incentive to maximize their impacts due
to a remedy put in place at the time of the 2003 merger of Carlton and Granada
(the two largest distributors of ITV) called Contract Rights Renewal (CRR). As
described above, contracts between advertising agencies and broadcasting sales
houses (like ITV’s) often depend on the channel’s SOCI. The terms agreed to
under the CRR by the newly merged ITV ensured that any decrease in its SOCI
would translate into a decreased discount on its SAP with buyers.23 This gave
non-PSBs an incentive to minimize ITV’s SOCI by maximizing their own impacts.
Figure 1 below demonstrates that, consistent with these arguments, both PSBs
and non-PSBs in our data supplied the maximum number of advertising minutes
that they were allowed.
Purchase Timing, “Balancing the Books,” and Measurement Error. An important fea-
ture of the UK television advertising market is that purchase decisions are made
by advertisers and their agencies several months in advance of the airing of the
advertisements. Purchase decisions are therefore based on the impacts they ex-
pect to be achieved by given programs in the market at prices they expect to be
realized. The actual impacts achieved and the actual price paid depend on the
scheduling decisions of broadcast houses (and viewing decisions by consumers)
and the actual SAP (less discount), which is itself determined at the end of the
month in which the ads are aired. If there are deviations between expected and
actual impacts and prices, these differences are reconciled in a process called
“Balancing the Books.”24
22This rule was instituted in the 1990s to allay fears that ITV, the dominant PSB, would
withhold airtime in an effort to increase their profit. In July, 2010, Ofcom withdrew this rule
from the market effective September, 2010. See http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/
consultations/asr/ for details.
23See http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/itc/uploads/Basic_
summary_of_the_Contracts_Right_Renewal_CRR_remedy.pdf for more details about
the workings of the CRR.
24A television sales house predicts its monthly SAP on the basis of its estimates of (advertiser)
expenditure commitments and consumer audience levels. The sales house then places booked
advertisements on a selection of spots in order to achieve the required number of impacts to ful-
fil the advertiser’s deal. If the sales house does not achieve sufficient impacts to fulfil the deal,
in effect the advertiser is paying a higher price per impact than agreed, and the sales house has
overtraded (or underdelivered). This results in the sales house having to give the advertiser extra
impacts in a future month. In practice deal debt situations such as these do not occur very fre-
quently, as a broadcaster monitoring its deals during the month takes action before the month’s
end. For example, if a sales house is expecting to have overtraded (underdelivered) towards the
8
In our econometric model, we allow for measurement error due to differences in
expected and realized prices and impacts induced by the timing of purchase de-
cisions in the UK advertising market. We note, however, that based on industry
sources, the magnitudes of any such measurement errors are likely to be small.
Following discussions with industry experts, we understand that, on average,
actual deviations between expected and actual commercial impacts and prices
are generally between 0 and 3%.25 In addition, the 2010 decision from the UK
Competition Commission (CC) on CRR described in detail the relevant process
and found that broadcasting sales houses continually optimize their placement
of ads to ensure that over- and underdelivery does not frequently occur.26
3. Data
We use a unique dataset to evaluate the inverse demand for UK television audi-
ences in this paper. The data were provided by Omnicom Media Group (OMG)
and consist of monthly data on impacts and revenues (from which we construct
prices) across the spectrum of UK television channels, as well as additional fac-
tors that might influence the demand for audiences.27
PSB and Non-PSB Channels. We focus our analysis on the main PSB and non-PSB
channels from January, 2002 until July, 2009.28 For PSBs, these are ITV1, C4, and
Five.29 In addition to these “flagship” channels each of the PSBs have introduced
end of the month, any company wishing to advertise at short notice will be charged a high pre-
mium as the opportunity cost of those impacts is high. Likewise, if the sales house has undersold
(overdelivered), it will sometimes offer late bookings at a lower price as the oppportunity cost of
those impacts is low.
25It is inherently difficult to measure these deviations exactly since buyers of advertising con-
stantly update their beliefs about future expected prices and impacts, the records for which are
not generally kept.
26See Competition Commission (May 2010) Review of ITV’s Contracts Rights Re-
newal Undertakings, Sections 2.28 to 2.31 and footnote 41, available at: http://www.
competitioncommission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2010/557ITV.htm
27These data were provided under strict non-disclosure and security restrictions exclusively
for the purpose of this analysis.
28We intended to analyze data from January 2000 onwards. However, two data reliability
issues led us to restrict our analysis to begin in 2002. First, we are not confident of the accuracy
of the data on Sky impacts which were gathered during 2000 and 2001. In addition to this, and
perhaps more importantly, 2002 saw the introduction of a new BARB panel. Some problems in
the new panel were well documented at the time, but what was not publicised was the condition
of the old panel towards the end of the contract. That panel became worryingly imbalanced,
which led to overt pressure on weighting structures. We therefore feel more confident about
measurement and demographic data from 2002 onwards. We end in July, 2009, as that was the
latest month available when we originally obtained the data.
29We have combined C4 and S4C - which replaces Channel 4 across Wales - together because
of S4C’s close relationship with C4. We do not include a final PSB, GMTV, as it is a relatively small
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additional “portfolio” channels over the last 15 years. For example, ITV owns
ITV2, ITV3, and ITV4 in addition to its flagship channel, ITV1. We intended to
evaluate each of these portfolio channel families (e.g., the ITV family consisting
of ITV2-4) separately, but our data isn’t as rich for them as for the other channels:
doing so yielded insignificant effects for these channels in nearly all equations
(including their own). Instead, we have aggregated all portfolio channels into a
”PSB digital” channel family and include that as a fifth “channel.”30
For non-PSB channels, we intended to evaluate the main non-PSB families (such
as Sky) on an individual basis. However, the data available for the Sky sales
house includes revenues from several third-party channels such as the Discovery
Channel and Nickelodeon, which are sold via Sky’s platform. As it is not pos-
sible to gather sufficiently disaggregated data which would allow us to separate
out the third-party channels from Sky’s own channels, we had to combine all
non-PSB channels that are not part of the ITV1, C4 or Five families into a single
channel grouping, denoted “Sky”.
Advertising Minutes. In Section 2 we described how the idiosyncratic nature of
industry regulations and conditions on a 2003 merger in the UK advertising mar-
ket ensure that both PSB and non-PSB channels sell all the advertising minutes
they are permitted to sell. Figure 1 reports, for each of the three PSB channels and
a representative sampling of non-PSB channels, the average number of advertis-
ing minutes sold per day over the course of our sample, Over the sample period
PSBs (non-PSBs) were permitted an average of 168 minutes per day, 7 minutes per
hour, and non-PSBs were permitted 216 minuted per day, 9 minutes per hour.31
The figure demonstrates that these caps were effectively binding throughout the
entire sample period. Because of this, all variation in monthly impacts within
and across channels of the same (PSB/non-PSB) type arises due to differences in
viewing within and across those channels rather than differences in the number
of advertising minutes within or across channels.
Channel-Specific Advertising Revenue, Prices, and Impacts. Our study utilises monthly
revenue data accumulated and maintained by OMG, split out by major channels
player in the market. We note that our estimates of “Total PSB” and “ Total Industry” variables
(e.g., impacts or revenue) could therefore be slightly less than those reported in other industry
sources.
30This is imperfect as it is likely that prices for, e.g., the ITV digital family would respond
differently to changes in (the flagship) ITV’s impacts than they would to changes in C4’s impacts.
Despite this weakness, we thought it preferable to include them under this restriction than to
drop them entirely from the analysis. All of our qualitative results are similar whether we split
them out and aggregate them, aggregate them with each one’s parent channel, or drop them from
the analysis.
31In addition to the daily average minute averages, channels were limited to providing a max-
imum of 12 minutes of advertising in any one hour of the day.
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Figure 1: Daily number of broadcast advertising minutes by channel
Notes: Reported are the average number of broadcast advertising minutes for a selection of PSB
and non-PSB television channels. The maximum allowable minutes of advertising per day for
PSBs is 168 minutes and for non-PSBs is 216 minutes. The average is taken across all the days in
our sample period, January 2002-July 2009. Source: Analysys Mason and BrandScience (2010).
and sales houses. Following industry practice, we construct monthly prices by
channel, CPT, for our viewing demographic (all adults) by dividing the chan-
nel’s monthly revenue by the number of impacts delivered by those adults. We
deflated the data using a headline measure of inflation (RPIX) so that all prices
are expressed in real 2002 GBP.
Within the advertising market, impacts for a specific advertising campaign are
measured and sold against a target demographic group. As such, demographics
are a key component in determining prices within the advertising market. We
note that the share of impacts delivered by demographic for all channels are al-
most constant over time, hence we use impacts and prices for all adult viewers
to a channel and do not distinguish between the component demographics de-
livered.
Figure 2 reports impacts (for all adult viewers) and prices (CPT) for each of the
main channels used in our analysis. For confidentiality reasons, we do not report
the level of prices in the lower panel. There is a clear cyclicality to the data (view-
ing and thus impacts are highest in winter months) as well as secular trends,
common to television markets around the world. Among PSB impacts, all impact
losses over the period are at ITV (-10.1%), while C4 (+1.0%) and Five (+1.2%) are
effectively unchanged. Sky impacts are up significantly (+77.0%). CPT has fallen
over the period for all channels, between -35.4% for Sky, -31.7% for ITV and -6.1%
11
Figure 2: Impacts and prices over time for the PSB channels and Sky
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for Five.
We also include in our model three other important variables. These are a chan-
nel’s share of commercial impacts (SOCI), the number of internet impressions,
measuring the demand for a growing substitute for television advertising, and
the value of the FTSE 100, measuring the income or wealth of the firms that de-
mand audiences from broadcasters.
4. Econometric Model
4.1 Overview
In this section, we outline our econometric model of the demand for advertising
in the UK television market. We begin by motivating why we choose to estimate
indirect demand equations rather than direct demand equations. We then dis-
cuss the likelihood and consequences of measurement error in our key variables,
impacts and prices, and outline our instrumental variables procedure.
4.2 Inverse versus direct demand
We specify inverse demand equations for each of the PSB (ITV, C4, Five) and non-
PSB (Sky, PSB Digitals) television channels that relate the price of advertising on
a given channel to the quantity of impacts offered by all channels. We choose to
specify inverse demand equations rather than direct demand equations because
it better reflects the nature of equilibrium in television markets: channels “bring
to market” a given number of impressions each month and the price of those
impressions adjusts to balance demand and supply. Inverse demand equations
are widely used in the analysis of markets for agricultural products and natural
resources in which prices rather than quantities are used to equate demand and
supply.32
As outlined in Section 2, PSBs and non-PSBs in the UK market offer all the adver-
tising minutes they can under the existing regulatory framework. In this institu-
tional environment, price is the only equilibrium adjustment mechanism avail-
able. Because advertising impacts are the product of viewers and advertising
minutes, this means that the supply of impacts is perfectly inelastic in a given
month. Even if advertising prices are very high in a given month, there is noth-
ing that a television channel can do to provide more impacts.
The primary consequence of estimating inverse demand equations instead of di-
rect demand equations is that one estimates a demand flexibility, define as “the
32See, e.g., Park and Thurman (1999), Holt (2002) and the references cited there.
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percentage change in the price of a commodity associated with a 1 percent in-
crease in the quantity demanded of that commodity ..., all else remaining con-
stant” (Houck (1965)), rather than the more familar demand elasticity. In a single-
product setting, the elasticity of demand is simply given by the inverse of the
flexibility.33 In a multi-product setting this relationship is more subtle: elastic-
ities hold other prices fixed while flexibilities do so for other quantities, which
destroys the simple inverse relationship.
Fortunately, these differences are immaterial if one is primarily interested in pre-
dicting the revenue consequences of a change in advertising minutes as we are in
this paper. Much as revenue decreases with price (and increases with quantity)
if demand is elastic (i.e. |∂ log(qj)/∂ log(pj)| > 1), revenue increases with quan-
tity (and decrease with price) if demand is inflexible (i.e. |∂ log(pj)/∂ log(qj)| < 1)
Eales and Unnevehr (1994).34 In what follows below, we focus on these revenue
effects in the interpretation of our flexibility results.
4.3 Expected impacts, expected prices, and measurement error
In Section 2 above, we described how purchases of advertising time are made
several months in advance of the actual airing of the ads and how they are based
on judgements by market advertisers and/or media buyers about the expected
impacts and expected price of impacts in that month. This means we would like
to regress expected (log) prices in period t, p∗t , on expected (log) impacts in this
period, q∗t :
p∗t = α + βq
∗
t + 
∗
t (1)
However, we are not able to observe these expected prices and impacts. We ob-
serve realized prices and impacts, which can be represented as the expected value
plus a measurement error:
pt = p
∗
t + ρt
qt = q
∗
t + ηt
(2)
Recall that observed prices are given by revenues divided by impacts. Thus the
error in observed prices, ρt, could originate either from deviations in revenues
from expectations or deviations in impacts from expectations. In the latter case,
impacts greater than that expected may reasonably yield prices lower than ex-
pected, or Cov(ρt, ηt) < 0 implying Cov(ρt, qt) < 0.
33The same is not true, however, for a mapping of estimated flexibilities into estimated elas-
ticities: Huang (2005) shows that the estimated own-price elasticity will be less elastic than that
implied by the inverse of the estimated own-price flexibility because the projection of a variable
Y on a variable X (as in OLS) is not the inverse of a projection of X on Y .
34Thus the reader should associate the revenue effects of inflexible inverse demand with those
of elastic demand (and similarly flexible inverse demand with inelastic demand).
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Substituting and rewriting equation (1) yields:
pt = α + βqt + (
∗
t + ρt − βηt)
= α + βqt + t (3)
where t = ∗t + ρt − βηt.
In the presence of measurement error in prices and impacts, there are three sources
of error underlying an inverse demand equation: shocks to expected demand in
period t, ∗t , measurement error in prices, ρt, and measurement error in impacts,
−βηt. Both of the latter two are problematic for OLS regression as both are cor-
related with qt. Positive shocks to impacts (ηt > 0) increase observed impacts,
qt > q
∗
t , and are (1) negatively correlated with measurement error in prices, ρt < 0,
and (2) positively correlated with −βηt - the attenuation bias common with mea-
surement error problems. Which of these potential biases is stronger, and thus
the direction of bias in an OLS estimator, is unknown ex-ante. In what follows,
we outline an IV estimation strategy that serves to address these concerns.
4.4 A inverse demand system for advertising on UK television channels
We now outline our econometric model and estimating procedure. Let t in-
dex months and let j index the television channels included in the analysis,
j = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, with j = 1 for ITV1, j = 2 for C4, j = 3 for Five, j = 4 for
Sky, and j = 5 for the PSB Digitals. A static inverse demand equation in logs is
then, for each of j = 1, ..., 5:
log pjt = α + βj1 log q1t + βj2 log q2t + βj3 log q3t + βj4 log q4t + βj5 log q5t
+ βj6 logSOCIjt +X
′
jtγj + jt (4)
where pjt is the price (CPT) of channel j in month t, qjt measures its impacts,
SOCIjt is its share of commercial impacts (SOCI) for the calendar year previous
to the one containing month t,Xt are other inverse demand shifters whose effects
on price are captured by γj , and jt ≡ ∗jt + ρjt −
∑5
k=1 βjkηkt consists of shocks to
advertisers’ expected inverse demand in period t as well as measurement error
in both pjt and each of the qjt’s. In each equation, we require instruments that are
correlated with each qjt and uncorrelated with the composite error, jt to solve
the measurement error bias inherent in OLS.
We consider monthly time lags for commercial impacts to be suitable instru-
ments. Advertisers as well as broadcasters use past values of impacts to pre-
dict future expected impacts. In particular, trends over the previous months and
year(s) are likely to be key factors in estimating the future supply of commercial
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impacts. Lags of impacts, qjt−k, are therefore likely to be correlated with contem-
poraneous impacts, qjt.
We also believe that these lags are not likely to be correlated with any of the
components of the error term, jt. The measurement error in commercial impacts
for a specific month is caused by the (incorrectly estimated) relative attractive-
ness of programs compared to other programs, or other factors such as sudden
weather shocks that influence the overall attractiveness of watching television.
In our view, it is highly unlikely that there is a correlation of errors in a particular
month, t, with lagged commercial impacts from previous months. The only case
where this assumption would be violated would be if there was serial correlation
in the measurement errors, ηjt and ρjt. However, as advertisers and broadcast-
ers closely track market developments over time, any unexpected supply shock
in the past will trigger an adjustment of expectations and should not lead to a
correlated shock (positive or negative) in an upcoming month.
5. Estimation and Results
5.1 Diagnostic Tests, Final Model Specification, and Estimation
In the course of our econometric analysis, we considered alternative specifica-
tions of the baseline model specified in equation (4) above that accommodate dy-
namic behavior. Dynamics are to be expected in this market for some of the same
reasons discussed earlier. In particular, since advertising purchase decisions are
typically made several months prior to outcomes being realized in the market,
it would not be surprising for prices and/or impacts lagged several months to
influence behavior in a given month t. Similarly, there are strong annual effects
in the data, suggesting behavior 12 and/or 24 months previous to a given month
may also influence behavior.
We analyzed the data for evidence of such dynamic effects in the implementation
of our econometric estimation. We began by exploring alternative distributed lag
structures. A model with a one-month lag of a channel’s own price was found to
be the best specification. We found no strongly significant effects on our overall
conclusions when including more lags of price or including lag impacts. Futher-
more, adding additional variables did not add further explanatory power or im-
prove performance in any of our diagnostic tests.
We next considered the specific functional form to select.35 To facilitate this deci-
sion, on an equation-by-equation basis we implemented the PE test of the linear
35Much like AIDS demand systems are a common choice of functional form in the estimation
of direct demand systems, indirect AIDS (or IAIDS) systems are sometimes chosen for the estima-
tion of indirect demand systems, particularly in the agricultural economics literature (e.g. Holt
(2002)). We considered this possibility, but decided a linear or log-log system captured all the
aspects we were interested in and was easier to implement.
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versus log-log model (Davidson and MacKinnon (2004)). There was not a consis-
tent model preferred across equations.36 We also estimated a Box-Cox model with
a single shape parameter for each of the price and five impact variables. While
there were still differences across equations, the shape parameter across equa-
tions tended to favour the log-log specification.37 The final econometric model
we chose was therefore a log-log model. For j = 1, . . . , 5, this was given by:
log pjt = α + κ
1
j log(pj,t−1) +
[
5∑
k=1
βjk log qk,t
]
+ β6j logSOCIjt +X
′
jtγj + jt (5)
We estimate the model using single-equation OLS and Instrumental Variables
(IV) estimation techniques.38 For OLS estimations we use Newey-West stan-
dard errors, with a three-lag autocorrelation structure for the residuals. In the
IV regressions, we used a Bartlett Kernel with a three-lag autocorrelation struc-
ture and calculated the standard errors of the two-step GMM procedure so that
they are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC).39 Changes in
the specified lag structure were not found to influence our results. For the instru-
mental variables estimation, each equation has five right-hand-side endogenous
variables (the impacts for each channel). We began with a common set of instru-
ments for each variable in all equations and then customized this specification
based on diagnostic tests including the first-stage F statistic measuring the sig-
nificance of the instruments, the Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions, and
the Hausman-Durbin-Wu (HDW) endogeneity test of the included (potentially)
endogenous impacts.40
While the outcomes of these tests varied across equations, some patterns emerged.
As a general rule, the lagged impacts for each channel were the most powerful
instruments for the current impacts of that channel. Furthermore, the first lag ap-
peared quite often to be a good instrument, the twelfth lag appeared frequently
to be a good instrument, and the second lag occasionally appeared to be a good
36The linear model was preferred in two cases and the log-log model in three. While we could
have implemented different functional forms, we preferred to have a consistent econometric spec-
ification across the equations.
37Across all specifications (linear, log-log, and Box-Cox), there were few qualitative differences
in the matrix of own- and cross-product flexibilities implied by the estimates.
38Estimating using system methods like SUR and GMM would be more efficient if all equa-
tions were correctly specified, but raises the possibility of inconsistency in all equations if even
one equation is mis-specified. We choose to be conservative and use single-equation methods.
39For the autocorrelation structure we use a Bartlett Kernel with a maximum lag order of 3.
Our OLS results with Newey-West Standard Errors also use a maximum lag order of three.
40Our baseline set of instruments were the one-, two-, three- and twelve-monthly lags of im-
pacts for all five channels, amounting to 20 potential instruments per equation.
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instrument. The final instruments selected for each equation are specified in Ap-
pendix Table C. The first-stage F-statistics, HDW, and Hansen J tests for each
equation are reported at the bottom of Table 2.
5.2 Results
Tables 1 and 2 report the OLS and IV estimates respectively for the key parame-
ters in each of our five inverse demand equations.
Short-run Flexibilities. We begin our discussion with the matrix of short-run flex-
ibilities given by the top five rows in Tables 1 and 2. The kjth element reports the
short-run flexibility of the channel in column j with respect to channel in row k,
e.g. the 3rd element in the first row of the IV results, 0.67, represents the cross-
flexibility of the price (CPT) of Five with respect to impacts of ITV1. It implies
a 10% increase in the number of ITV1 impacts would be associated in the short
run with a 6.7% rise in the price Five could expect to receive, controlling for the
impacts of the other channels in the market. Of particular interest are the own-
impact flexibilities, given by the diagonal (jjth) elements in each set of results.
In the OLS and IV specifications, for all channels, the short-run own-impact flex-
ibilities of each set of results are estimated to be inflexible. Estimates in the OLS
results range from -0.34 for the Digital PSB channels to -0.84 for Five. Short run
flexibilites arising from the IV estimations range from -0.06 for the PSB digitals
through to -0.81 for Five. Estimates of short-run own-impact flexibilities are sta-
tistically different from zero except for the IV point estimate for the PSB digitals.
Interpreting these own-impact flexibilities for the PSBs suggests a 10% increase
in the number of a channel’s own impacts would decrease prices by 7.5% for ITV,
6.8 % for C4 and 8.1% for Channel 5, holding all other market impacts fixed. As
discussed in section 4.2, inflexible inverse demand predicts that (here, short-run)
revenue would increase in response to an increase in the impacts provided by
each channel on the market.
The short run in our setting is defined to be immediate, i.e. within an individual
month. There are two mechanisms in the market that may yield different effects
in the long run. The first is the time it takes for market developments to filter
into the outcomes of decisions made by participants in the market. We described
earlier how decisions by market participants about advertising plans take several
months to be implemented and captured these dynamic effects by including, in
each inverse demand equation, lagged prices. The second is the impact changes
in the economic environment may have on a channel’s share of (industry) com-
mercial impacts (SOCI). Industry experts report that SOCI influence prices paid
by advertisers to channels, and as discussed in Section 2 is determined on an an-
nual basis using the previous year’s total impacts. The long run in our setting
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Table 1: OLS Estimates of Inverse Demand Curves for Advertising.
Log CPT Log CPT Log CPT Log CPT Log CPT
ITV1 C4 Five Sky PSB Dig.
Short-run Flexibilities
(Log Impactst)
ITV1 −0.68 0.01 0.07 −0.02 −0.53
( 0.26)** ( 0.11) ( 0.18) ( 0.11) ( 0.23)**
C4 0.14 −0.81 0.21 −0.04 −0.09
( 0.09) ( 0.11)*** ( 0.13) ( 0.08) ( 0.12)
Five 0.06 0.14 −0.84 0.14 0.24
( 0.20) ( 0.12) ( 0.20)*** ( 0.10) ( 0.25)
Sky −0.04 0.28 0.12 −0.68 0.59
( 0.19) ( 0.25) ( 0.29) ( 0.25)*** ( 0.34)*
PSB Dig. 0.04 −0.01 0.04 −0.03 −0.34
( 0.05) ( 0.04) ( 0.08) ( 0.06) ( 0.07)**
Other Parameters
Log CPTt−1 0.20 0.29 0.20 0.56 0.37
( 0.09)** ( 0.09)*** ( 0.12) ( 0.14)*** ( 0.13)***
Log SOCIt 0.76 0.40 0.31 0.32 0.03
( 0.43)* ( 0.42) ( 0.31) ( 0.60) ( 0.10)
Log Internet Impactst −0.14 −0.18 −0.23 0.00 0.05
( 0.08)* ( 0.05)*** ( 0.09)** ( 0.07) ( 0.10)
Log FTSEt 0.21 0.28 0.42 0.15 0.52
( 0.06)*** ( 0.08)*** ( 0.17)** ( 0.06)* ( 0.11)***
Spec. Test (p-value)
BG Autocorr. 0.07 0.16 0.24 0.59 0.08
White’s Heterosk. 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
PE Test 0.69 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.59
Notes: Newey-West Standard Errors in paranetheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Month
dummies and a constant also included but not reported. Test statistics reported for each equation
include the p-values for the Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation of maximum order 3 in the
residuals, the White test for heteroscedasticity, and the PE test for log-log versus linear functional
form. Note that the top panel provides estimates of the short-run flexibilities. See Section 4.2 and
Table 3 for more detail.
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Table 2: IV Estimates of Inverse Demand Curves for Advertising.
Log CPT Log CPT Log CPT Log CPT Log CPT
ITV1 C4 Five Sky PSB Dig.
Short-run Flexibilities
(Log Impactst)
ITV1 −0.75 0.54 0.67 0.18 −0.04
( 0.28)*** ( 0.20)*** ( 0.44) ( 0.13) ( 0.28)
C4 0.33 −0.68 0.15 −0.21 −0.14
( 0.12)*** ( 0.10)*** ( 0.25) ( 0.13) ( 0.21)
Five 0.36 0.30 −0.81 0.31 −0.28
( 0.26) ( 0.15)** ( 0.45)* ( 0.14)** ( 0.40)
Sky −0.35 −0.12 0.09 −0.53 0.95
( 0.32) ( 0.32) ( 0.49) ( 0.26)** ( 0.39)**
PSB Dig. −0.04 −0.01 0.13 −0.01 −0.04
( 0.08) ( 0.06) ( 0.10) ( 0.08) ( 0.11)
Other Parameters
Log CPTt−1 0.22 0.30 0.23 0.57 0.23
( 0.09)** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.10)** ( 0.10)*** ( 0.09)***
Log SOCIt 0.11 −0.19 0.57 0.30 −0.25
( 0.43) ( 0.40) ( 0.38) ( 0.55) ( 0.17)
Log Internet Impactst −0.09 −0.06 −0.19 −0.02 −0.08
( 0.07) ( 0.09) ( 0.11) ( 0.05) ( 0.10)
Log FTSEt 0.25 0.35 0.34 0.15 0.41
( 0.05)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.17)** ( 0.06)** ( 0.10)***
First Stage F-stat.
ITV Impacts 6.86 3.46 3.75 6.35 3.01
C4 Impacts 5.37 6.09 4.04 2.69 6.06
Five Impacts 9.98 8.77 7.71 9.49 11.10
Sky Impacts 6.11 5.87 9.24 5.03 5.86
PSB Dig. Impacts 23.89 13.37 22.72 11.39 22.42
Spec. Test (p-value)
Hausman-Durbin-Wu 0.42 0.28 0.92 0.21 0.24
Hansen J-test 0.28 0.54 0.18 0.28 0.25
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Errors in paranetheses. ***
p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Month dummies and a constant also included but not reported. For
each equation we report the F-statistics for each first stage regression of the five endogenous vari-
ables (each channel’s log impacts). Instruments included in the final regression specifications are
detailed in Appendix Table C. Test statistics reported for each equation include the p-values for the
Hausman-Durbin-Wu endogeneity test and the Hansen J-test of the overidentification conditions.
Note that the top panel provides estimates of the short-run flexibilities. See Section 4.2 and Table 3
for more detail.
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is therefore between one and several years. We describe the long-run flexibili-
ties implied by our IV results, which are our preferred estimates, after further
discussing the parameters and specification tests in Tables 1 and 2.
Other Parameters and Specification Tests. The remaining parameters in Table 2
largely accord with intuition. Lagged prices appear to be statistically and eco-
nomically important determinants of existing prices for all channels. Also as ex-
pected, internet impacts are generally associated with lower prices for television
impacts and a generally better corporate economic environment, as measured by
the FTSE 100 stock market index, is generally associated with higher advertising
prices. Across all specifications we cannot identify a strong association between a
channel’s SOCI and own prices. This stands in contrast to industry expectations
and descriptions of price setting behaviour which had emphasized a positive as-
sociation between SOCI and prices.41
Tests for serial correlation (using the Breusch-Godfrey test), heteroscedasticity
(using the White test), and linear versus log-log functional form (using the PE
test) While some there is some evidence of serial correlation in both the ITV1
and PSB-Digitals equations, additional lags of the dependent variables or lags
of explanatory variables made little difference to the test statistic and produced
qualitatively and quantitatively similar results to those reported in the table. Al-
though the PE test indicates linear functional form may be preferred over the
log-log specification for the Five and Sky inverse demand curves, we keep the
log-log specification so that functional forms are consistent across equations.
Tests regarding instrument validity are reported at the bottom of Table 2. While
the first stage F-statistics are below the ‘rule-of-thumb’ level of 10 (Stock et al.,
2002), this ‘rule’ does not apply to environments with autocorrelation like that
we analyze here.42 The final set of instruments used in each regression specifica-
tion gave us the best possible results in terms of instrument strength. Although
41One possible explanation for this is that over our short sample period each channel’s SOCI
does not move by a large enough amount for the regression specification to precisely estimate
the impact of SOCI over and above contemporaneous impacts. An alternative explanation is that
after accounting for contemporaneous impacts there is no relationship between prices and SOCI,
and industry wisdom of the positive association is actually picking up the relationship between
prices and contemporaneous impacts, which are highly correlated with SOCI over time. We de-
cided to keep SOCI in our final regression specificiations because we believe the cost of including
a potentially irrelevant variable (larger standard errors) is smaller than the cost of omitting a
relevant variable, and the resulting omitted variable bias. Omitting the SOCI variable from the
regression specifications and re-computing the counterfactual results has no qualitative impact
on the results we document below, but does tightens the standard errors on long-run flexabilites
and counterfactual predictions.
42Recent theoretical work by Olea and Pflueger (2013) and Moreira and Moreira (2015) inves-
tigates testing for weak instruments in the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
However, their results are derived conditional on the presence of only one endogenous variable,
whereas our setup features five endogenous variables.
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the Hausman-Durbin-Wu statistics indicate that endogeneity may not be a major
concern, we prefer the IV regression results because the market environment de-
scribed in Section 2 indicates the presence of (small) measurement errors are an
institutional feature of the UK television advertising marketplace.
Long-run Flexibilities. Table 3 reports the long-run flexibilities associated with
both the OLS and our preferred IV estimates. They are given by the following
formula, derived in Appendix D:
∂ log pLRjt
∂ log qkt
=

βjk+β6j(1−SOCIjt)
1−κ1j
if k = j
βjk−β6jSOCIkt
1−κ1j
if k 6= j (6)
These long-run flexibilities include the indirect effect on flexibilities of the SOCI,
captured by the second term in each numerator. They also differ from the short-
run flexibilities by taking into account pricing dynamics which were modelled
though including lagged own price in the regression specification. The presence
of SOCI in the long-run flexibility (under the assumption β6j > 0) makes long run
demand more flexible than its short-run counterpart. These larger (in absolute
value) flexibilities mean smaller long-run revenue effects, impling that changes
in impacts that are profitable in the short-run may be less profitable after long run
adjustments. In addition, the inclusion of lagged price as a regressor means that
(holding fixed the SOCI coefficient) long-run flexibilities are larger in absolute
value than the short-run estimates. This effect reinforces that profits in the long
run may be less responsive to changes in impacts than in the short run.
The estimates reported in Table 3 show that, with one exception, demand is gen-
erally estimated to be inflexible.43 The exception is Channel 4, which has long-
run demand with a own-flexibility point estimate of -1.21.44 Comparing long-run
own-flexibilities to their short-run counterparts we see that long run flexibilities
are generally larger in absolute magnitude - i.e that long-run demand is more
flexible than short-run demand. When demand is less inflexible in the long-run
43We note that the standard errors of the estimated long-run flexibilities are relatively large.
This can mostly be attributed to including the SOCI in the regression specification - which was
estimated imprecisely in the regression results in Table 2.
44Recall that, for a single demand curve, the revenue effect of inflexible demand is like that for
elastic demand in that an increase in price (equivalently a decrease in quantity) lowers aggregate
revenue whereas the revenue effect of flexible demand is like that for inelastic demand in that an
increase in price (equivalently a decrease in quantity) increases aggregate revenue. Effects in our
model are more complicated due to the interaction of demand across the five channels/channel
groups. The counterfactual exercises conducted in Section 6 account for all the own- and cross-
channel effects to measure the revenue consequences of changes in aggregate impacts for each
channel and/or channel group.
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compared to its short-run equivalent, holding other impacts fixed, long-run profit
changes from an expansion in own impacts are smaller than in the short-run.
The cross-flexibilities between channel pairs play an important role in our coun-
terfactuals presented in the next section and therefore deserve some discussion.
Cross-flexibilities between each of the PSBs (ITV, C4 and Five) are estimated to
be positive. This suggests that most channel pairs are complements: increases in
the impacts provided by Five cause a decrease in the price of ITV’s impacts as
advertisers shift their spending from ITV to Five, lowering ITV’s demand. This
is not necessarily surprising: if advertisers have fixed budgets, a decrease in the
price of one channel’s impacts yields not only increased purchases of advertising
time on that channel, but might also free up budget to purchase time on other
channels as well.45
Differences between OLS and IV results. There are modest but substantively im-
portant differences between our estimation results using OLS versus IV. Focusing
on the own-impact flexibilities, we see that the IV results are (but for Sky) more
flexible than the OLS results. This implies that the consequences of measurement
error induced by the time lag between when decisions are made in the UK ad-
vertising market and when the data underlying this study were realized tends to
bias upwards (i.e., smaller in absolute value) estimated inverse demand flexibil-
ities. There are substantial differences in the cross-flexibilities, which are mostly
estimated to be zero in the OLS results but positive in the IV results. These cross-
flexibilities provide an ‘amplification mechanism’ by which increases in impacts
for one channel, while lowering its price, increases prices for other channels, in-
fluence their revenues. We show in the next section that the net effects of these
biases is for the OLS estimates to generally understate the revenue response to
increases in advertising minute regulations.
6. Counterfactual Analysis of Changes in Limits on Advertising Minutes
6.1 Preliminaries
Media regulators across Europe have recently been evaluating existing limits on
the amount of television advertising their PSBs are permitted to show. 46 In
the UK, PSBs can provide a daily average of 7 minutes per hour of advertising,
45While some channel pairs have point-estimates that suggest they are complements, Table 3
shows that none of these are statistically significant using our preferred IV estimates.
46As discussed in the Introduction, in 2016 the European Commission considered relaxing its
12 minute per hour regulation due to rising competition from Internet Video. After consulting
with sector regulators in the member countries (who generally impose stricter limits than the EU
directive), the Commission ultimately kept the regulation unchanged.
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while non-PSBs can provide an average of 9 minutes per hour. As part of a re-
view of the television advertising sector in 2007, the UK media regulator, Ofcom,
considered whether changes in those limits may help it achieve its regulatory
objectives “to further the interests of citizens and consumers ... in relation to ...
[inter alia] ... the range, quality, and appeal of television services throughout
the UK.” ((Ofcom, 2008, p9)). In the consultation evaluating this issue, it con-
sidered three different trajectories for advertising minutes: (1) maintaining the
status quo (which we will refer to as “baseline”), (2) “harmonizing up”, and (3)
“harmonizing down,” where harmonizing up (down) would eliminate the dif-
ference in regulatory treatment between PSBs and non-PSBs by allowing PSBs
to advertise up to a daily average of 9 minutes per hour (requiring non-PSBs
to advertise no more than a daily average of 7 minutes an hour).47 This review
was placed on hold during the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009 and advertising
minute regulations have since remained unchanged.48
In this section, we evaluate the consequences of each of the harmonizing up and
down options based on our estimates of the inverse demand for advertising in
the UK television advertising market. We base our revenue predictions on 2008
values of the explanatory variables, the last full year for which we have data.
We conduct simulations for each channel using a parametric bootstrap from the
distribution of regression coefficients implied by the results in Tables 1 and 2.
We draw 1000 coefficient samples for each channel separately and later combine
them to predict industry effects. To consider the effect of each proposed change
in impacts, we set all right-hand-side variables at their year-2008 means from Jan-
uary 2009 onwards (except the month dummies) and predict sequences of chan-
nel revenue paths.49 In the baseline scenario, we keep impacts at their year-2008
averages and forward-simulate log prices based on our parameter estimates for
each bootstrap sample. Revenue in a given month is then calculated as the prod-
uct of the exponentiated log price with the quanity of impacts. In each counter-
factual scenario, we set impacts at their new (unchanged, increased, or decreased,
depending on the policy scenario) level beginning in January 2010. This changes
47In the consultation, Ofcom used the terms “levelling up” and “levelling down”. They also
considered changing the restrictions on advertising minutes within sub-periods of the day, for
example during peak periods. The nature of our data set with key variables at monthly time
frequency mean we are unable to consider such changes. See (Ofcom, 2008, pp11-20) for more
details.
48Changes in advertising minute regulations were again considered in 2010, but were delayed
due to competition concerns that caused Ofcom to consider referring the industry to the UK
Competition Commission (CC) for a market investigation (Ofcom (2011)). In December 2011,
Ofcom decided both to refrain from referring their concerns to the CC and to leave advertising
minute restrictions unchanged.
49One could also imagine conducting counterfactual simulations based on predicted paths of
impacts after 2008 rather than fixing impacts at their 2008 levels. However, the purpose of our
counterfactuals is not to predict the evolution of the industry, but to suggest the likely effects
relaxing (or tightening) advertising minute limits would have on channel revenues however the
industry evolves.
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the log impact variables in each equation directly and changes the log SOCI for
year 2011 onwards by shifting each channel’s relative share of impacts. We again
forward-simulate log prices based on our estimates for that bootstrap sample and
predict the revenue path. We simulate revenues forward as far as needed, find-
ing that all dynamics are resolved by the end of 2012. In our results below, we
compare the average (across bootstrap samples) annual revenue for each channel
in 2009 against that in 2012.50 Annual averages are useful because they smooth
out the variability in results due to across-month differences in predicted prices
and revenues.
Before presenting our results, we describe how much impacts were forecast to
change under each of the proposed policies considered by Ofcom. While it would
seem that they would simply rise or fall by the appropriate ratio, this misses the
fact that the limits are daily averages and that channels can deviate from those
averages within individual clock hours. For example, all channels provide ad-
vertising far above the daily average in peak periods when viewership is highest
so as to maximize the impacts they can deliver from their ad minutes. As such,
allowing PSBs to provide a daily average of 9 minutes/hour instead of the cur-
rent 7 will not increase impacts as much as 28.6% (=9/7) as all channels would
still be restricted from providing more than 12 minutes in any clock hour. Ofcom
was well aware of this restriction and therefore calculated the likely change in
impacts that would result from both the harmonizing up and harmonizing down
scenarios. Table 4 summarizes the changes in impacts predicted by Ofcom.
Table 4: Changes in Advertising Minutes under Harmonizing Up and Harmo-
nizing Down
Harmonizing Harmonizing
Channel Up Down
ITV1 8.0% 0.0%
C4 12.3% 0.0%
Five 10.0% 0.0%
Sky 0.0% -6.9%
PSB Digitals 0.0% -6.9%
Notes: These are the estimated changes in impacts that would arise from “Harmonizing Up”
advertising minutes for PSBs from a daily average of 7 minutes per hour to the 9 minutes per
hour currently allowed non-PSBs and “Harmonizing Down” advertising minutes for non-PSBs
from a daily average of 9 to the 7 minutes per hour currently allowed PSBs. Source: (Ofcom, 2008,
pp74,76). Results for the PSB Digitals were not provided in the Ofcom table. We have assumed
that their impacts fall by an amount equal to that for non-PSBs as a whole (6.9%).
50We chose to compare annual revenue in 2012 to the 2009 values so that we are comparing
revenues that come directly from the prediction excercise, rather than the data in 2008 and the
model in 2012. There is little qualitative difference in results if we choose to compare 2008 to 2012.
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Table 5: Revenue Effects of Upward Harmonization - IV Estimates.
Baseline Harmonizing Up Difference Percentage
(£mill.) (£mill.) (£mill.) Change
ITV1 1,037 1,146 109 10.56
(35.75) (42.99) (30.12) (2.94)
C4 533 580 48 9.00
(22.32) (26.10) (19.18) (3.69)
Five 207 236 29 13.83
(7.31) (21.51) (17.24) (8.01)
Sky 547 555 8 1.53
(14.83) (35.63) (34.23) (6.34)
PSB Dig. 344 328 -16 -4.77
(19.72) (34.37) (19.55) (5.91)
Total PSB 1,777 1,963 186 10.45
(45.94) (76.04) (57.04) (3.19)
Total Industry 2,668 2,846 178 6.69
(39.12) (74.51) (69.94) (2.64)
Notes: Bootstrap Standard Errors, in parentheses, are calculated as the standard devi-
ation across the 1000 draws. This table reports counterfactual long-run channel, total
PSB, and total industry revenue based on our IV inverse demand estimates for the pol-
icy of upward harmonization that allows public service broadcasters (PSBs) to air the
same number of advertising minutes per hour as non-PSBs from 1 January 2010, an in-
crease from 7 to 9 minutes/hour (168 to 216 minutes/day). Predicted revenue arises for
any month by setting the explanatory variables in each equation to their average 2008
values (plus the impacts and implied SOCI from the policy change from 2010), pre-
dicting (log) prices, and multiplying them together. This is done for every month for
1000 bootstrap replications of our analysis, the baseline (2009) and long-run (2012) av-
erages of which are reported here. Revenue is measured in million January 2002 British
pounds. The corresponding values of this analysis for our OLS results are provided in
Appendix Table A.
6.2 Counterfactual Results
Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate the effects of each proposed policy on each channel or
channel group included in our analysis, as well as for all PSBs and the industry
as a whole.51 In a nutshell, harmonizing up is estimated to increase PSB and in-
dustry revenue whilst harmonizing down is estimated to leave both unchanged.
Consider first harmonizing advertising minutes for PSBs up to the level now
enjoyed by non-PSBs. Table 5 shows that harmonizing up is estimated to increase
the annual revenue for PSB channels by 10.6% for ITV1, 9.0% for C4, and 13.8%
51Revenue predictions that arise from the the OLS inverse demand estimates are presented
in Appendix Tables A and B. As suggested earlier, the OLS results underestimate the revenue
effects when compared to the IV results presented here, although do yield tighter standard errors
around their predictions. Qualitiatively the results are similar.
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for Five. There are negligible estimated long-run effects for Sky or the Digital
channels owned by the PSBs. The estimated effect for PSBs as a whole is an
increase in revenue of an estimated 10.5% and for the industry as a whole an
increase in revenue of 6.7%. Each of the effects for ITV1, C4, PSBs as a whole,
and the industry as a whole are is statistically significantly different from zero at
conventional significance levels.
The relatively large revenue increases for each of the three main PSB channels
stem from two effects. For ITV1 and Five, which are estimated to have inflexi-
ble long-run demand, the increase in advertising minutes directly increases rev-
enue by increasing own channel impacts. For Channel Four, whose long-run de-
mand is estimated to be flexible, this is not the case - an increase in own impacts
stemming from more advertising minutes is predicted to decrease long-run rev-
enue. However, these own-flexibilities are not the entire story - estimated cross-
flexibilites play a role in determining revenue. The long-run cross-flexibilities
reported in Table 3 suggest that increases in impacts from other PSBs influence
channel revenues. Since these cross-flexibilities are positive and indicate com-
plementarity between PSB channels, increases in impacts from other PSBs lead
to increases in revenues. For ITV1 and Five, these cross-flexibilities augment
the revenue increases from the inflexible demand. Whilst for Five, the positive
revenue effects from the cross-flexibilities overcome the revenue decrease from
having flexible own long-run demand.
Table 6 demonstrates our predicted revenue effects when a policy of downward
harmonization is implemented. Sky and the PSB digitals are estimated to expe-
rience revenue losses (although only for the PSB Digitals is the effect statistically
significant). Revenue for ITV1 is estimated to rise by 4.2% whilst other PSB chan-
nels are estimated to have no change in revenue. PSB and Industry revenue are
expected to be unchanged as a result of the decrease in ad minutes on Sky and
the Digital PSBs.
The economic mechanisms at play in the downward harmonization scenario are
slightly different to those discussed in the upward harmonization case. Chan-
nel Four and Five are unaffected because prices for these channels advertising
are estimated to not be responsive to changes in the impacts of Sky and the PSB
Digitals. The estimated long-run flexibility for ITV in response to Sky Impacts is
-0.49 which suggests that prices for ITV impacts rise when impacts on Sky fall un-
der the change in regulation. This is because advertisers will want to substitute
away from Sky across to ITV1, it’s largest competitor, because it now has rela-
tively more impacts which, in turn, drives up ITV prices. PSB Digitals experience
the biggest loss because the estimated positive cross-flexibility between them and
Sky delivers an additional revenue decrease on top of the own-flexbility effects.
The increase in ITV revenue counterbalances the large fall in revenues incurred
by the PSB digitals, leaving industry revenue unchanged although there is a pre-
dicted reallocation of revenues across channels towards ITV1.
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Table 6: Revenue Effects of Downward Harmonization - IV Estimates.
Baseline Harmonizing Up Difference Percentage
(£mill.) (£mill.) (£mill.) Change
ITV1 1,037 1,081 44 4.20
(35.75) (49.44) (23.65) (2.22)
C4 533 535 2 0.45
(22.32) (24.95) (12.74) (2.38)
Five 207 208 1 0.43
(7.31) (12.07) (7.15) (3.43)
Sky 547 543 -3 -0.56
(14.83) (22.85) (21.20) (3.93)
PSB Dig. 344 295 -48 -14.20
(19.72) (27.10) (11.09) (3.75)
Total PSB 1,777 1825 47 2.64
(45.94) (67.44) (38.15) (2.12)
Total Industry 2,668 2,663 -4 -0.16
(39.12) (53.74) (38.03) (1.42)
Notes: Bootstrap Standard Errors, in parentheses, are calculated as the standard de-
viation across the 1000 draws. This table reports counterfactual long-run channel, to-
tal PSB, and total industry revenue based on our IV inverse demand estimates for the
policy of downward harmonization that restricts non-PSBs to air the same number of
advertising minutes per hour as PSBs, a decrease from 9 to 7 minutes/hour. Predicted
revenue arises for any month by setting the explanatory variables in each equation to
their average 2008 values (plus the impacts and implied SOCI from the policy change
from 2010), predicting (log) prices, and multiplying them together. This is done for
every month for 1000 bootstrap replications of our analysis, the baseline (2009) and
long-run (2012) averages of which are reported here. Revenue is measured in million
January 2002 British pounds. The corresponding values of this analysis for our OLS
results are provided in Appendix Table B.
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Discussion. Two brief comments are in order about the identification of these
counterfactual policy effects. First, is it reasonable to predict counterfactual rev-
enue effects for levels of advertising minutes not previously seen in the data?
Our answer is yes. The key consequence of changes in advertising minutes is
that they allow broadcasters to sell more or fewer impacts. While the number of
advertising minutes may never have reached a daily average of 9 minutes per
hour for PSBs, the associated impacts that would arise under such a policy has
arisen before: the advertising impacts implied by both the harmonizing up and
harmonizing down policies are impacts that have previously arisen in the mar-
ket.
Second, it is worth noting the difference in results that arises when one uses an
IV approach compared to simple OLS. Tables A and B in the Appendix report
the estimated effects of the policies of upward- and downward harmonization
using our OLS results. The difference is noticeable. Looking across the upward
harmonization results in Table A we see revenue increases about half the size for
the PSBs. At the Industry level we predict revenue increase of 2.83% (compared
to 6.6% above), but we cannot reject that there would be no effect at all. This
reinforces the importance of using IV in the presence of the types of measurement
error likely to arise in the UK advertising market.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we use a unique, proprietary dataset to estimate the inverse de-
mand for advertising across five channels or channel groups in the UK televi-
sion market. We find that long-run inverse demand is largely inflexible (akin to
finding that long-run demand is elastic), although the effects differ significantly
across channel groups. We use the results of our analysis to evaluate the impact
of several proposed changes to television advertising limits in the UK market.
We find that a policy of upward harmonization of advertising minute limits for
public-service broadcasters (PSBs) to the level currently in place for non-PSBs
would increase advertising revenues for each of the main UK PSBs (ITV1, C4,
and Five) and also increase total industry revenue. While we do not measure the
consequences of increased advertising minutes on the television viewer experi-
ence or the effectiveness of advertising, we nonetheless conclude that permitting
more PSB advertising minutes should be considered to help support PSBs in the
face of increased competition from both multi-channel television providers and
the Internet.
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A. Counterfactual Revenue Predictions for Upward Harmonization - OLS
Results
Table A: Revenue Effects of Upward Harmonization - OLS Estimates.
Baseline Harmonizing Up Difference Percentage
(£mill.) (£mill.) (£mill.) Change
ITV1 980 1,048 68 6.97
(38.25) (52.91) (36.11) (3.69)
C4 497 519 22 4.45
(17.31) (20.05) (21.56) (4.40)
Five 210 221 11 5.30
(8.44) (11.32) (6.23) (2.95)
Sky 542 531 -10 -1.87
(21.38) (35.36) (34.88) (6.68)
PSB Dig. 362 344 -17 -4.94
(18.19) (32.98) (19.85) (5.71)
Total PSB 1,686 1,787 101 6.01
(55.89) (68.54) (44.54) (2.66)
Total Industry 2,590 2,663 73 2.83
(53.59) (100.89) (79.19) (3.06)
Notes: Bootstrap Standard Errors, in parentheses, are calculated as the standard devi-
ation across the 1000 draws. This table reports counterfactual long-run channel, total
PSB, and total industry revenue based on our OLS inverse demand estimates for the
policy of upward harmonization that allows public service broadcasters (PSBs) to air
the same number of advertising minutes per hour as non-PSBs from 1 January 2010,
an increase from 7 to 9 minutes/hour (168 to 216 minutes/day). Predicted revenue
arises for any month by setting the explanatory variables in each equation to their aver-
age 2008 values (plus the impacts and implied SOCI from the policy change from 2010),
predicting (log) prices, and multiplying them together. This is done for every month for
1000 bootstrap replications of our analysis, the baseline (2009) and long-run (2012) av-
erages of which are reported here. Revenue is measured in million January 2002 British
pounds. The corresponding values of this analysis for our IV results are provided in
Table 5.
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B. Counterfactual Revenue Predictions for Downward Harmonization - OLS
Results
Table B: Revenue Effects of Downward Harmonization - OLS Estimates.
Baseline Harmonizing Up Difference Percentage
(£mill.) (£mill.) (£mill.) Change
ITV1 980 1,011 31 3.21
(38.25) (35.47) (16.93) (1.78)
C4 497 493 -4 -0.88
(17.31) (18.68) (9.16) (1.84)
Five 210 209 -1 -0.26
(8.44) (9.16) (5.00) (2.38)
Sky 542 556 14 2.82
(21.38) (20.80) (34.02) (8.67)
PSB Dig. 362 327 -35 -9.78
(18.19) (34.51) (11.92) (3.52)
Total PSB 1,686 1,712 26 1.56
(55.89) (58.20) (25.94) (1.55)
Total Industry 2,590 2,595 5 0.19
(53.59) (58.69) (27.54) (1.10)
Notes: Bootstrap Standard Errors, in parentheses, are calculated as the standard devi-
ation across the 1000 draws. This table reports counterfactual long-run channel, total
PSB, and total industry revenue based on our OLS inverse demand estimates for the
policy of downward harmonization that restricts non-PSBs to air the same number of
advertising minutes per hour as PSBs, a decrease from 9 to 7 minutes/hour. Predicted
revenue arises for any month by setting the explanatory variables in each equation to
their average 2008 values (plus the impacts and implied SOCI from the policy change
from 2010), predicting (log) prices, and multiplying them together. This is done for
every month for 1000 bootstrap replications of our analysis, the baseline (2009) and
long-run (2012) averages of which are reported here. Revenue is measured in million
January 2002 British pounds. The corresponding values of this analysis for our IV re-
sults are provided in Table 6.
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C. Final Instruments for IV Regressions
Table C: Instruments used IV Estimation of Inverse Demand Curves.
Log CPT Log CPT Log CPT Log CPT Log CPT
ITV1 C4 Five Sky PSB Dig
Lag 1 Impacts
ITV1 X X
C4 X X X
Five X X X X X
Sky X X X X X
PSB Dig. X X X X X
Lag 2 Impacts
ITV1 X X X
C4 X
Five X
Sky X X X X
PSB Dig. X X X
Lag 3 Impacts
ITV1 X X X X
C4 X
Five X X X X
Sky X X X X X
PSB Dig. X X X X
Lag 12 Impacts
ITV1 X X X X
C4 X X X X
Five X X X X X
Sky X X X X
PSB Dig. X X X X X
Notes: This table reports the final set of instruments used in the estimation of each
inverse demand curve. ’X’ denotes inclusion as an instrument for the inverse demand
curve in each column. Instrument selection took place as follows: We started with the
set of 20 possible instruments for each equation and then removed potential instruments
one-by-one, as long as the F-Statistics of the First-Stage regressions were not adversely
impacted. The corresponding regression results are provided in Table 5.
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D. The Calculation of Long-run Flexibilities
In this subsection, we describe how we calculated the long-run flexibilities re-
ported in Table 3.
From Equation (5) in the main text, the long-run effect of a change in log qkt on
log p1t is given by
∂ log pLRjt
∂ log qkt
=
βjk + β6j(∂ logSOCIjt/∂ log qkt)
1− κ1j
There are two long-run effects of a permanent change in log impacts of chan-
nel k, log qkt: a direct effect, captured by βjk, and an indirect effect through the
Share of (industry) Commercial Impacts offered by that channel, captured by
β6j(∂ logSOCIjt/∂ log qkt). This indirect effect follows naturally from the defini-
tion of SOCI:
SOCIjt =
qjt∑5
k=j qkt
logSOCIjt = log qjt − log(
5∑
k=j
qkt)
⇒ ∂ logSOCIjt
∂ log qkt
=
{
1− SOCIkt if j = k
−SOCIkt if j 6= k
E. Comparison of Results with Ofcom-Sponsored Studies
Portions of the analysis presented here are based on the UK Office of Commu-
nications (Ofcom) reports from May 2010 (Analysys Mason and BrandScience
(2010)) and September 2011 ((Analysys Mason (2011))) described in footnote 9 of
the main text. This subsection explains the differences between those reports and
this paper.
In contrast to the results in this paper, both reports found that estimated own-
impact flexibilities (called ”inverse elasticities” in the reports) were broadly flex-
ible, and the first report found that a policy of harmonizing down would gen-
erally increase channel revenue, while a policy of harmonizing up would gen-
erally decrease them. While the data underlying those reports and this paper
are identical, there are three important differences in the econometric models im-
plemented here that drive the differences in the estimated flexibilities and thus
the predicted impact of counterfactual changes in advertising minute limits. The
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first difference centres on the treatment of seasonality: the models in the Ofcom
report used a subset of monthly dummies in each channel equation as opposed
to the full set of dummies used in the analysis in this paper. The second differ-
ence centres on the final functional form of the econometric model: in the Ofcom
reports, linear and log models were tested and a linear model was selected; in
this paper, we tested linear, log-log, and Box-Cox models before selecting the log
model. The third difference is that in this paper we split out non-PSB impacts into
two groups: Sky impacts and PSB Digital channel impacts. Informal tests suggest
it is the first of these modeling differences most responsible for the differences in
predicted revenue effects.52
52We were able to estimate flexibilities in linear and Box-Cox models and found them all to be
qualitatively similar to those presented in our final results in Table 1, suggesting our functional
form decisions aren’t driving the differences. Furthermore, we included all the month dummies
in a sample of the regressions underlying the reports and found them to indeed significantly
reduce in absolute value the estimated own-channel flexibilities.
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